https://credomag.com/article/natural-theology-and-van-til/
Classical Theology in this case is in reference to Aristotelian-driven Scholastic Theology and Thomism. This group (Credo Magazine) represents the Thomist revival in Reformed theology. It's sort of ironic that all of this is starting to really take off after the 2017 death of RC Sproul who championed it - but didn't live to see it.
That said, the issues are complicated as there are also strong Scholastic tendencies and tensions within Van Tillian circles as the commitment to Confessionalism is retained. The advocates of 'Classical Theology' have a point in that the Scholastic ethos was dominant at the time the confessions were produced in the 17th century.
Continental philosophy took some different turns in response to the Enlightenment and its debated whether the post-Kantian turn was a legitimate outcome of Enlightenment thought or a reaction to it. Reformed theology was also affected by the Enlightenment and in the Anglo-American sphere the Scholastic Confessional tradition was read through this analytic lens - increasingly a scientific-driven lens, which was (and is) still within the confines of the older Empiricist-driven epistemology.
The rightly or wrongly perceived crisis brought on by the Enlightenment produced modernity, and within the Church this in turn produced textual criticism and liberal theology. A couple of generations later, Darwinist-Materialist secularism spawned something of a scramble and a crisis of fragmentation, and the Continental tendency toward holistic thought became very attractive to some, but it also had epistemological complications. Continental thinkers tended to distrust sense-experience and the inductive processes associated with empiricism - which were built on (in Christian thinking) old foundations laid by Thomism and other Scholastic schools.
This is where natural law and theology come into play. Are they reliable? Can philosophy discover such truths that would aid those seeking answers in revelation - as well as those seeking to develop a means for fleshing out a cultural or civilisational set of doctrine and ethics? The Scriptures (and in particular the New Testament) offer little help to this end and so the thinkers of Christendom were forced to turn to philosophy, laws of nature, and questions of epistemology.
It's not hard to see why the Christian Continental tradition would see the Scholastic nature/revelation hybrid as merely a vehicle for idolatry, rooted in a low-view of the Fall, and an elevated view of man's ability. It may be possible for Christians to flesh out a cultural doctrine, but this would only be though the means of right-reason activated by faith. In other words philosophy (and what can be derived from nature) is valid but only in light of faith and the Spirit-activated reason it affords. Otherwise it's a sure road to idolatry. For others faith and reason are inseparable - faith literally is right reason, the deductive result of a correct epistemology. Some (including this author) might argue this is not faith at all but rationalism masquerading as faith.
That's the real debate here. From my standpoint both camps are misguided though I would certainly appreciate the Continental approach if forced to choose between the two, though it has also been legitimately argued that this 'Faith Seeking Understanding' approach can falls prey to the influences of philosophy to an even greater degree than the synthesis view of so-called Classical Theology.
The influence of Van Til, Kuyper, and others have led to some dilemmas and internal contradictions in terms of social thought, historical narratives, and in the realm of theology - or more properly theological prolegomena and questions related to how theology itself is pursued.
I think Fesko's criticism is valid from the standpoint of Reformed Scholasticism and in particular the way it manifested itself in 19th century or post-Revolutionary America. He certainly would have Old Princeton on his side. While this pedigree is of little value to someone like me, for many in the circles of American Reformed theology this carries a lot of weight and has led to a real questioning of Van Tillian Presuppositionalism.
Fesko plays some word games when it comes to Van Til, natural theology, and Calvin. Man can know things and yet be blind as a mole. This is not a contradiction because when we say 'know', there are different levels of knowledge. Man can tinker with and probe nature and determine certain things but because reality is fundamentally metaphysical or spiritual they are not truly known. There is a kind of limited but flawed knowledge. It may be able to determine functional truths about aerodynamics, electrical current, optics, and the like but any attempt to extrapolate meaning, teleology, causation, or ethics from these things will be necessarily flawed and limited by temporal categories and conceptions. An incomplete knowledge will lead to false conclusions and an overall corrupted picture of reality. Such idolatrous thinking may be sufficient for pagans to build civilisations and Providence may use this to restrain evil, but these are not pathways to God.
I think where the Van Tillians lose the argument is when it comes to the Confessions. For me this is not an issue as the Confessions while of some value are nevertheless replete with flaws and errors - but for those who have subscribed to them, these problems must be addressed and reconciled. The Van Tillians would be better served by moving beyond them.
Fesko's interaction on these points makes for an interesting read - one that is at least partly correct and yet this does not mean that Fesko's position is Biblical. Van Til may be inconsistent with regard to the Confessions and even in general, and yet I would say overall his position is closer to the truth than the Thomism being promoted by Fesko and his associates.
For my part I celebrate the Kantian destruction of Western Metaphysics as well as Hume's decimation of causality and ultimately epistemology. I also laud WVO Quine's later decimation of Kantian epistemological categories as well as the Prussian's attempt to re-cast metaphysics. I do not lament the resulting wasteland. This is not to say that the metaphysical realm isn't real or even supreme but that its means of access is not philosophy.
I lean toward the arguments of men like Montaigne, Bayle, and Pascal who tended to embrace Pyrrhonism - the functional destruction of philosophy. The end result is a choice between nihilism or the embrace of revelation. I would argue enough of a basic implied coherence remains that such a move is possible and even necessary as Paul testifies to in Romans 1. And yet we know this is not possible apart from the work of the Spirit (Romans 8.4-39,1 Corinthians 1.18-31). The answer is not found in a philosophical school or a right epistemology but in Christ. He is the answer to the chaos, the light in darkness. The answer is not found in the Right Reason of Augustine and Anselm, the synthesis views of Thomas or Fesko, but in the Christ/Wisdom rejection of philosophy as outlined by Paul in 1 Corinthians.
Far be it from me to favour the ESV over the King James but the idea in Romans 1.18 is that of suppression. The problem is not with the King James or the text upon which it is based but rather a problem with English and the fluidity of meaning which is ironically one of the reasons why philosophy is a dead end. This is not to say that basic reason does not come into play in order for communication to occur but this is not without problems - all the more when it comes to the interaction between the eternal and temporal, the finite and infinite, the Creator and creature.
Nature can expose inconsistencies in man's thought and action. It can hint at greater truths and glories but given the effects of the Fall and the ever-presence of death, it is an untrustworthy guide and a foundation of sand. Combined with Scripture it does not elucidate but corrupts as is seen in the legacy of Thomistic-Aristotelian philosophical theology and its more extreme Enlightenment forms. Even as Fundamentalism sought to counter modernist theology, it boxed itself in by its Baconian commitments and even now stands ready to self-destruct. In other cases it can only hope to retain its narrative by alliance with political power that will (they hope) shut down the voices of opposition.
Fesko is right in that both Bavinck and Van Til (and Kuyper we might add) were affected by the logic of Hegel's holistic epistemology - which has played a fundamental role in the formation of today's 'worldview' thinking which many (erroneously) deem critical to the Christian political project. This coherentist approach contrasts strongly with the kind of correspondence-driven epistemology of the empiricist tradition. Again, both approaches are problematic from my standpoint as both rely on synthesis. The theologians inspired by Van Til are still driven by philosophical theology but are more likely to 'limit concepts' and allow for paradox and dialectic than are the empiricist-correspondence approaches. Kant's antinomies come to mind and may play a part in this and the drive toward transcendental argument.
I would argue instead for a Scriptural correspondence which must be differentiated from the misnamed Scripturalism of the Rationalist philosopher Gordon Clark. His rather limited view is but another example of synthesis and a faith that is not faith at all. The correspondence I speak of embraces all the mysteries that Paul was steward of and reveals - and yet does not resolve. The mystery of the Incarnate Christ is the only resolution, not philosophical deduction. New Testament doctrine (as well as both Old and New Covenant prophecy) is replete with dynamics, unresolved tensions and dialectics, paradoxes, and mysteries. It relies of redemptive-historical unfolding and contextualisation and I would argue both the Incarnation and Trinity reveal not only the nature of doctrine but the Scriptural logic that compares spiritual things with spiritual. Sadly, while the early ecumenical councils upheld truth on these points it did so by means of building a house of theology on Hellenistic philosophical foundations. Church history is in part a story of the fallout from this - in many respects a continuation of the age-old battle between Platonic and Aristotelian thought. And so it is with Fesko's critique of Van Til and the Presuppositionalists.
The debate over the Westminster Confession and the old theologians of the Reformed tradition is always interesting, but misses the larger point - at least to me. For those who have a stake in the narrative and the claims of denominations and institutions, the arguments carry a lot more practical weight and significance. Ultimately I find them to be a distraction as I don't believe these men nor these man-made documents to be the standard.
The debate over apologetics rages on and I find it interesting to note where these challenges to Van Til arise. I would expect hyper-Calvinists and Calvinistic Baptists (such as Dolezal) to be critical of him. And certainly Arminians, Fundamentalists, and Evangelicals will have little use for such an apologetic as they are far more likely to rely on either Classical methods or even Baconian Evidentialism. The Van Tillian position seems a perfect fit for a group like the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (OPC) and its narrative-driven embrace of being a faithful minority vis-à-vis the larger Church and culture. And yet there has always been some opposition to Van Til within the OPC and clearly Fesko is part of this minority camp.
The issues at hand are becoming more pressing for various denominations and institutions and for those engaged in the culture war. Continental philosophy while powerful to destroy the Empiricist basis of contemporary Anglo-American culture, is too esoteric, fragmented, and overtly philosophical to build upon. And yet it's hard to see how Baconian-Evidentialist approaches can survive without sawing off the branch upon which they sit. The Thomist-Aristotelian approach has a narrow appeal and in some respects is least likely to gain traction in a culture dominated by Scientism and its materialist assumptions. The Van Tillian school is attractive to some because it can demolish the presuppositions and epistemology of the modern culture but on a practical level it's too heady for the average person in the pew - and thus of limited value to those seeking to motivate a mass movement.
And yet it is the Pyrrhonist approach that destroys all. Admittedly there is a risk in that, but once the slate is swept clean, there is room to build - and yet on a completely different and antithetical foundation. It won't build a new Christendom for the very concept is alien to the New Testament. It's at best a counterfeit of Zion. There's little appetite for such a view at present but the day just might be on the horizon. Let us continue to watch, reflect, and labour.
While both major camps attempt to claim Paul, his use of reason and appeals to nature are found within a different matrix. The key to this is 1 Corinthians. The apostle's stance on philosophy and critique of it all but dominates the epistle. Even when it's not the primary subject, it's in the background - the opening chapters are the foundation of his reasoning. Many run to Romans 1 at this point - seeking ground as it were and build on that foundation. But they read too much into it - even while ignoring (at their peril) the lessons directed at the church in Corinth. Romans 1 contains profound truths regarding man's innate knowledge but the epistle to Corinth shows how such knowledge simply goes off the rails apart from the Spirit. It elucidates and limits but in no way diminishes the profundity of Paul's words in Romans 1.