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29 July 2025

Erdogan, the Kurds, and the Caucasus

https://www.politico.eu/article/abdullah-ocalan-pkk-recep-tayyip-erdogan-turkey-kurdistan/

https://www.asianews.it/news-en/Turkey-celebrates-peace-with-the-PKK-but-tightens-its-grip-on-the-CHP-with-hundreds-of-arrests-63483.html

https://www.turkishminute.com/2025/07/17/syrian-kurdish-official-rejects-turkish-calls-to-lay-down-arms-says-sdf-seeks-integration-instead/

Erdogan has been in power for over twenty years and his tenure has been transformative - breaking with decades of Kemalism and Ataturk's secular vision for a modern Western-leaning state. Erdogan has shifted Türkiye to a presidential system, securing his power and while he is certainly a strong-man and authoritarian, his rule and word are not absolute.

Early on as he moved away from the secular ideology of Kemalism, he made an unprecedented attempt at rapprochement with the Kurds who had been warring against Ankara since the 1980's. The Kurds lost out in the post-WWI break-up of the Ottoman Empire and were unable to secure a state of their own and remained divided between Türkiye, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The Turkish government oppressed them and under the leadership of the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) they fought a long hard guerilla war against Ankara - whose secular administrations and NATO-aligned military were backed by Washington. The fight was long and bitter and so it shocked everyone when Erdogan reached out to them. As an Islamist (which is not the same as a Salafist) he wanted to ground the nation's identity in Islam as opposed to Turkishness - the nationalism which had been the organising principle of Kemalism. The Kurds are mostly Muslim and so this seemed to be a way forward and one that would boost his (Justice and Development) AKP movement as it faced significant opposition from Türkiye's secular establishment.

It remains controversial, but Erdogan uncovered a plot to subvert and overthrow his government and he instigated a purge. This upset the Americans who had close ties to the Turkish military. And he had already earned Washington's enmity by refusing to facilitate Bush's 2003 invasion of Iraq. These were also the heady days after 9/11 and the US had big plans for Central Asia - a Pan-Turkic strategy that required Ankara's participation and yet Erdogan was not on board. The US turned to Islamist cleric Fethullah Gülen who had left Türkiye in 1999, but had from exile worked with Erdogan and had through his various schools and media outlets made significant inroads into both Türkiye and the Turkic nations of Central Asia.

But everything began to change about 2011. The US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had stagnated and Washington's plans went sideways. They still couldn't oust Erdogan and yet it was around this time he fell out with Gülen and tensions increased. The Syrian Civil War began which turned into a black ops bonanza as Washington and its NATO allies ran guns and fighters into the country which fragmented and turned into a bloodbath. Erdogan was upset that the Kurds carved out an autonomous region (Rojava) in the Northeast of Syria and he also was involved in the civil war backing Chechen, Circassian, Uzbek, Tatar, Turkmen, Uighur, and some Salafist factions. Shortly thereafter, ISIS exploded onto the scene further tearing apart the Middle East. Libya was in chaos and Erdogan was once again at odds with Washington.

Erdogan then turned against the Kurds in Türkiye itself. They had formed political parties such as the People's Democratic Party (HDP) but then tensions in Syria and Iraq wrecked this arrangement. Then in July of 2016 there was the attempted coup and assassination of Erdogan. The coup failed and led to an authoritarian clampdown. The tolerance for Kurdish politics had come to an end. The rapprochement was over.

Erdogan blamed the United States, its Gulf allies, and Gülen - and with reason. More than once the US had sponsored and sanctioned military coups in Türkiye. This one failed and Erdogan would persist in extended purges and in the further consolidation of power. The US would wage economic war on the country and Washington became enraged as Erdogan continued to turn to Moscow and elsewhere for friendship and weapons sales. Under Erdogan, Türkiye has become the black sheep of NATO, it's EU application is dead and it's now preparing to enter the SCO and BRICS - the two international organisations established as an opposition to Atlanticist structures such as NATO and the G7. Not since Greece in the 1980's has NATO faced such a crisis. And yet Greece is not Türkiye - it does not share the same strategic importance.

The US wants Erdogan gone and yet in 2018 he shifted the country to a presidential system - once again seeking to consolidate power. And it seemed as if he was relatively secure but the burden of inflation, fatigue with his government, and other factors have finally turned the tide. The opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) has made substantial electoral gains and so Erdogan has instigated a new clampdown - an unabashed authoritarian move. He's arresting opposition candidates by the hundreds - destroying any pretense of democracy. Gülen having died in 2024 is now out of the picture - once again limiting US means. And yet, Erdogan is still pursuing people with ties to Gülen with over two-hundred arrests in May-June 2025. The issue is very much alive.

And even though he's seemingly dispensed with democracy, he's still looking for popular support. The new Kurdish rapprochement has emerged from this context. Abdullah Öcalan, the founder and leader of the PKK, has been sitting in his island prison since 1999 when he was captured in the Greek embassy in Kenya - an operation facilitated by Washington. Öcalan has told the PKK to stand down and disarm. Erdogan has promised a new era and yet Kurds are wary and wondering if Öcalan is the same man any more or if he isn't just cutting a deal to have a chance at a few years of freedom before he dies. Even the ultra-nationalist MHP leadership is supporting this attempt to make peace with the Kurds - something unthinkable in previous decades. The MHP's paramilitary arm, the Grey Wolves is notorious and violent and known for attacking minority groups such as Kurds and Alevis. Mehmet Ali Agca is their most famous member, the man who attempted to assassinate John Paul II in 1981.

The US-backed Syrian Kurds who are loosely affiliated with the PKK (every video I've seen shows them flying PKK flags with Öcalan's face, even while Washington denies they are members), are unwilling to disarm given the precarious situation in Syria with the new ex-al Qaeda government and ISIS-Daesh still on the loose. They have also been managing the US-financed large-scale concentration camps where thousands of ISIS members, affiliates, along with wives and children are held. This may create an obstacle in Erdogan's plan. He hopes he can bring the Kurds on board with the AKP and have enough support to grant some legitimacy to his retention of power. The election isn't until 2028 and so a lot can happen between now and then.

In the meantime, Erdogan is also continuing to back Azerbaijan who basking in their Ankara-supported victory over the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh are seeking to connect their Nakhchivan exclave via the Zangezur corridor which will result in a further loss of Armenian territory.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/8/in-armenia-a-bitter-dispute-escalates-between-pm-pashinyan-and-the-church

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-offers-oversee-disputed-armenia-azerbaijan-corridor

https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2025/7/10/the-south-caucasus-is-slipping-from-russias-grasp

Azerbaijan has shifted its foreign policy away from Moscow and while retaining close ties with Türkiye, it has also cultivated a close relationship with Washington and Tel-Aviv. This was the emerging alignment of the 1990's but one that was wrecked by Erdogan's tensions and disputes with Washington and Israel.

The region remains complicated. For years, Washington tended to support Azerbaijan over Armenia who was part of an unofficial Moscow-Yerevan-Tehran axis. In support of Türkiye, the Americans wouldn't acknowledge the Armenian Genocide. That changed under Biden. He angered Erdogan by publicly acknowledging it in a calculated move to woo Yerevan away from the Moscow orbit. Armenia has been torn apart by factions wanting the country to turn toward the EU and the West while other elements wish to stay within the Moscow orbit and reject Western liberalism. The war in Nagorno-Karabakh further tore apart the society as they were trounced on the battlefield and their historic ally in Moscow failed to come to their aid - Putin being tied up in Ukraine.

The shift in the United States has been palpable. For years the American Evangelical community all but ignored the Armenians - like the Palestinians they weren't the right kind of ethnic Christians. That has all changed and now they are a cause célèbre - Evangelicals even using the Artsakh nomenclature for Nagorno-Karabakh in a way akin to the Judaea-Samaria labels for the West Bank. Pardon my cynicism but one has to wonder if this shift wasn't the result of some kind of directive or initiative from high ranking elements within the GOP.

Armenia is currently embroiled in a huge scandal - a contest between the president (Pashinyan) and the Armenian Orthodox Church. Pashinyan is trying to steer Armenia into the arms of the West and has their support. The Orthodox Church is opposing Pashinyan and blaming him for the 2023 defeat at the hands of Azerbaijan. They consider him a traitor in league with the Turks and the West. Conspiracies are everywhere. Pashinyan has raided church buildings, there are accusations of secret children out of wedlock, coup attempts, and connections to oligarchs and the criminal underworld. It's complicated but there's some truth to the accusations - on both sides.

Everything could blow up again with the new push by Azerbaijan to forge the Zangezur corridor across Armenia's Syunik Province, and the US is trying to step in and mediate - pushing Moscow out and making Putin irrelevant. The US been trying to push into the Caucasus since the 1990's - they long supported the Chechen insurgents in the 1990's operating out of Georgia's Pankisi Gorge. US support for and cooperation with Salafists was the policy norm through the 1980's and 1990's. This ended for about a decade after 9/11 at which point the policy reverted - and the US continues to work with some of these elements to this day. Every situation is different.

I'm sure it's a bitter irony for Putin that his attempt to stop NATO expansion by means of his 2022 invasion of Ukraine has created the conditions for the US to re-activate some of its plans from the 1990's and the post-9/11 era. But of course two decades on, everything has changed and with Trump in office, US policy lacks any kind of real direction or coherence.

It's worth noting that the other regional player, Iran has almost been removed from the equation. The relationship between Baku and Tehran has long been marked by tension as historical Azerbaijan is now divided between the post-Soviet nation based out of Baku and Iran's north-west province - also known as Azerbaijan. The Azeris are Turks and yet tend to be Shiite. Even Ayatollah Khamanei is part Azeri. But now Iran cannot provide any support for its long-time ally Armenia nor oppose the Baku regime it rejects and views as separatist. This marks another 'win' for the US.

This proposed Zangezur Corridor is also important because it creates a link between Türkiye and the Caspian Sea which then allows direct connection to Central Asia for pipelines. The US was dreaming about this in the 1990's when Türkiye was basically its proxy. Now it's set to happen but under Erdogan. Once again, I'm sure Washington remains hopeful that if they can just get Erdogan out - there's a new world of possibility.

But this will be at the expense of Armenia and it's hard to say what will happen in terms of its internal politics. Yerevan has broken with Russia - even though there's still a base on their territory. Azerbaijan has entered a near hostile phase with Moscow especially after the June raid in the Urals - one in which Russian security forces attacked Azeris. This story goes down the rabbit hole - it's about big money backers, media outlets, organized crime, drugs, and attempts to influence politics. The Al Jazeera article paints it as diaspora policing - an attempt to exert power even as soft power abroad is failing. I would see it as more than that. Moscow is worried about internal plots and subversion. Western media sees Russian spies, secret ops, and sabotage everywhere - even when it's not. Well, don't think for a moment that Washington, Kyiv, and their NATO and regional allies aren't at work within Russia itself. You can count on it and I'm sure we don't know the whole story regarding the raid in Yekaterinburg.

At the heart of all these geopolitical disputes and calculations is Türkiye. For good reason it has been referred to as the Pivot State. Sitting at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea - and with its proximity and cultural connections to Central Asia it has for so long been a critical piece of real estate. This is why the US brought Ankara into NATO early on and has long sought to cultivate a warm friendship with the Turks and has also unabashedly interfered in its politics when it was felt necessary. Recep Tayyip Erdogan wrecked all this. He is a thorn in Washington's side and they cannot seem to shake him loose.

For Erdogan (now 71), domestic strife and tumult have him worried and so he's re-arranging the board of Turkish politics. He looks kind of desperate, even though he's the most powerful president since Ataturk. And yet, he's also on the cusp of a great breakthrough - nearing the Neo-Ottoman ideological goals that everyone was once talking about. Türkiye's influence has spread in defiance of Washington. I'm sure there are American strategists that will hope they can inherit this broader Turkic sphere of influence once he's gone. He can't last forever but others I'm sure are wondering if at this point too much damage has been done and Ankara is now beyond Washington's orbit. The final chapters haven't been written yet and a lot can happen. Developments in Syria, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean, and Ukraine could all change the dynamics. Erdogan is a survivor and that fact alone is somewhat impressive.

The US expressed great angst regarding his cozying up to Moscow over a decade ago and yet as many have argued it's hard to see the relationship lasting. The two nations have such different interests and historically they have been at odds. From the Crimean Tatars to the contests in the Caucasus, to Black Sea issues and energy in Central Asia - their interests and objectives are not only different but often opposed to one another. The only issue that has driven them into an informal alliance is the United States. If Ankara and Moscow turn hostile - what will that mean? Given how the dynamics of Eastern Europe and the Middle East are changing, it's hard to say. Iran was defeated by Netanyahu but Israel was bloodied - the Iron Dome failed to stop a lot of missiles. Israel has tried to cover up the extent of the damage. Things are calm at the moment but the situation remains fragile and Gaza has not been resolved.

Western media still tries to stoke fear by suggesting Russia plans to invade Europe and start an open and direct war with NATO. This is a hard sell given that Putin couldn't even make it to Kyiv. Russia is advancing now but with little hope apart from dictating the terms of an unhappy settlement - an attempt to save face and at least get some kind of guarantees regarding NATO expansion.

While Russia proved to be far weaker than expected, and no longer able to project regional influence as before - they can't be counted out either. The situation remains dangerous. I find myself lamenting these developments as Christians in Europe have been manipulated and whipped up into a war footing and militarist frenzy. These developments have divided Right-wing parties and there are real tensions between nationalist ideologies and narratives and practical needs in the realms of trade and energy. That's all part of this too. The US wanted Central Asia gas and oil - and to make sure Moscow and Beijing didn't get it. Well, Beijing is getting it and it looks like Ankara might play a bigger role in the near future. Biden for all his weaknesses had in some respects gotten the Brzezinksi Chessboard strategy back on track. But now with these new developments and a second Trump administration, it's difficult to see how America will prevail. Trump is a wrecking ball but his management style is weak and it allows elements within the government to work with a free hand - and they're clearly busy.

There's a final factor in all this - the EU. They have been working assiduously in Central Asia to offer an alternative to the long-time regional players. Türkiye would love to cut a deal with the EU but there's a lot of bad blood. But it could be that Brussels in angling for its own standing and given that it's no longer able to rely on the US - it could become a more significant factor in how all these events play out.