13 February 2019

The False Exposé (Part 1)


The False Exposé. It's a concept I've talked about from time to time but it deserves a closer examination. What exactly is it?

An exposé by definition is that which make visible, in this case it's a reference to a work which reveals guilt or wrongdoing, it shines light on corruption. So how then can it be false?


What I'm referring to as the false exposé is not wholly false. These works genuinely reveal secrets and uncover wrongdoing. However, they're false in that their ultimate aim is to defend the institutions and indeed the very system they seem to be criticising.
For example look at the works of Ronald Kessler. I'm thinking in particular of his 2002 book on FBI secrets. On the one hand he reveals much. He doesn't shy away from some of Hoover's crimes and misdeeds. But on the other hand (in the end) he seems to defend Hoover and justifies his many abuses of the Constitution. Hoover made mistakes, but we just need to learn from them, move on and make sure we don't revisit that period in history. He's quite critical of William Sessions and Louis Freeh and thus his work has the appearance of being a serious exposé, an example of adversarial journalism at its best.
However this is not the case. Kessler obviously has not only access to the important players in the FBI (and the Executive Branch) but he has repeated access, something denied to real exposé writers and antagonists. His criticisms are in many cases mere echoes of other power players within the system. Yes, even journalists are utilised and used by the people in power, leaders who leak classified info and who speak off the record. If Kessler was really adversarial, he wouldn't have been able to write the books he's written and doors would have been shut to him long ago.
Aren't people in the FBI etc. bothered by the allegations and revelations of wrongdoing? They are, but these things are out there anyway and what Kessler is doing is allowing for them to be dealt with and effectively (in many cases) whitewashed and explained away. Certain figures can be blamed, figures like Freeh who obviously has many enemies.
The fact that Kessler all but fingers Mark Felt as Deep Throat in 2002... a full three years before he was revealed in 2005 by Vanity Fair magazine is also telling. Now Kessler is certainly an intelligent investigator and it's quite possible he came to these deductions on his own. However I seriously doubt he would have risked the ire of laying a charge like that on someone who was largely revered within the FBI. Felt had been brought down in humiliation for his pursuit of the Weather Underground. The practices that had once been par for the course under Hoover resulted in a conviction for Felt. Though pardoned by Reagan, his career and legacy were under a cloud as far as the larger public was concerned. For many within the FBI, Felt had done 'the right thing' and for Kessler to accuse him of being the leaker/whistleblower par excellence, a role many would view as treasonous, ran the risk of alienating many of the people who granted him access.
But if Kessler was merely reporting what some already suspected, then his 'outing' of Felt takes on a different character. It's a shot across the bow.
Kessler airs a lot of FBI dirty laundry and there's plenty of dirt to be found... including much he doesn't air and much that he whitewashes. Since he reveals some of the dirty stuff, he can be trusted, right? You can take his word for it that the really bad stuff... including the stuff he ignores.... has no credibility. Right?
Wrong. Kessler is a friend of the FBI and ultimately his works are about defending the institution. Reformers, those with an axe to grind, and those seeking revenge can all make use of him. His books have a certain value to be sure but at the same time, their real value is limited.
Tim Weiner's books on the CIA and FBI function much in the same capacity. These organisation-approved works are full of good information and yet when fully considered one realises that Weiner is a friend to these organisations. These exposés are really exercises in self-criticism, mechanisms for reform and in some cases propaganda for future historians. Certain historical facts continue to be denied and whitewashed. One task of the false exposé is to re-contextualise and reshape the narrative, often utilising large unspoken assumptions about what the United States is, stands for and what its role has been and should be. To many these are non-negotiables and yet such a view is neither ethical nor does it make for good, honest and accurate history.
Like Kessler's criticisms of the Freeh era at the FBI, Weiner represents a faction critical of the George W Bush era. The CIA despite giving its unofficial imprimatur to the work openly criticised Weiner's book which is interesting because such a press grabbing move more or less ends up plugging it and drawing attention to it. Generally speaking unless a book represents an existential danger, the usual response is silence. Silence is meant to dismiss it. Interaction implies a degree of credibility.
Weiner's works on these agencies are largely critical endorsements, but clearly many reviewers (both Right and Left) don't seem to grasp that. In the case of Weiner and other false exposé authors the 'keystone cops' critique is actually meant to buttress the agencies, and as a consequence flood them with more money and resources.
I've mentioned elsewhere a discussion I had with a friend regarding 'Syriana', the movie adaptation of Robert Baer's 'See No Evil'. Now it can be argued the director of the movie took the story in a different direction than what Baer had intended. 
The movie's message about US power and the international order is cynical, but to my amazement some (like my friend) interpreted the movie as a call for more investment and believed that it represented the CIA as bungling and in need of greater resources, manpower and leadership. On the contrary it represents the agency as sinister, Machiavellian and self-serving. Individual agents (like Baer or George Clooney in the movie) are expendable. They (even as agents) can't see the big picture and the government will (without hesitation) treat them as expendable.
And there are genuine conflicts within the government itself, something I've also focused on from time to time. America presents a fascinating history of contradictory ideas, hypocrisy and lies and rule of law narratives about democracy. These are mostly rubbish. Behind the facade and the myriad agencies and bureaucrats who believe the deception, lie the real agents of power. In order to maintain the facade, a game must be played, a complicated dance in the dark. Baer was personally burned. His story demonstrates the CIA's greatest fear is exposure, and perhaps on one level, its greatest foe is the FBI.
Gerald Posner's works also fall into the category of false exposé and yet perhaps represent a nuance slightly different from the previously mentioned examples. While he doesn't seem to have some of the inside connections one finds with Kessler and Weiner, he is ultimately determined (it would seem) to defend mainstream-safe narratives. In his case he reveals a great deal about the Vatican as well as considerable government corruption when covering something like the Kennedy and King assassinations. And yet, in virtually every case the Establishment-safe conclusion is reached. His utter credulity regarding the deaths of figures like Calvi and Sindona as well as willingness to accept government pronouncements and 'official' investigative results seriously harms his credibility in my book.
When it comes to the critical points that would take the story to the next level or break it, the ties to organised crime, murders versus suicides... Posner always defends the official story. He'll even admit the connections between the CIA, Vatican and Organised Crime but he makes such connections out to be accidental rather than deliberate or systemic and thus they can be dispensed with as anomalies.
Why does he probe these questions and yet always back down and land in the 'safe' zone? Well, no one can really answer such a question for someone else. But again, access is important. Digging too deep burns bridges. At other times such digging can begin to threaten not just a few powerful players but such investigations risk shattered the integrity of a larger system. I believe (along with others) that the investigations of  Danny Casolaro and Gary Webb as well as the information possessed by figures like the DC Madam represented existential threats to the larger system. Their investigations were quashed as a result, the voices were silenced and in some cases they paid for their knowledge with their lives.
Posner's works never stray into that kind of territory. He might push the envelope and certainly there are figures (within the Roman Catholic Church for example) that would have no affection for him, and yet he's not really exposing anything not already known... and yet at the same time he's whitewashing much that warrants further investigation.
Posner may have other connections... connections at a deeper level related to his time at Cravath, Swaine and Moore. Additionally there are some authors who don't want to burn bridges when it comes to the mainstream press and the award circuit. They will push – but only so far.
John Dinges's work The Condor Years reminded me of this. An Ivy League professor of journalism who formerly worked for NPR and the Washington Post, he tackled Operation Condor, the 1970's conspiracy in which various Latin American countries (spearheaded by Chile's Pinochet) plotted to eliminate Left wing opponents and share intelligence. Eventually they would turn to assassinations, striking targets not only in Latin America but in Europe and even the United States.
It is widely understood that the United States played a major role in this operation and many point to Henry Kissinger as its architect and puppet-master. Pinochet (it could be argued) was often acting at the behest of Kissinger and certainly under the protective aegis of Washington.
Dinges even while revealing a rather stunning transcript of an exchange between Kissinger and Pinochet, explains away this narrative by pulling out State Department cables which seem to suggest that US diplomats were worried about what was happening and that Kissinger's great sin is not complicity or conspiracy but a lack of vigilance and due diligence. In other words, Dinges admits there were American officials who knew about what was going on, officially condemning it but at the same time simply choosing to look the other way. And once again we're back to... mistakes were made and there may have been a few rogue players but overall the US was honourable.
Dinges's work qualifies as a false exposé. There's a long history of the CIA dodging the State Department and FBI. Kissinger more than anyone else was able during his tenure to run Deep State operations even while maintaining the official veneer. How much can be proved? This question strikes at the heart of such investigations. You're never going to find the smoking gun but you have to dig and sometimes the circumstantial evidence can become overwhelming.
But Dinges, who I would guess probably knows and suspects far more than he's willing to put in print, won't go there. The American Michael Townley who played a prominent role in Condor assassinations is Latinised (de-Americanised) and relegated to being an agent for Chile's DINA. And yet Dinges never informs the reader that Townley was not only a CIA agent but even today lives in the United States under witness protection. Townley was directly involved in the Letelier murder which took place in Washington DC and also involved a US citizen. And yet, the US government is protecting him? Why? Dinges won't even speculate... and thus actually ends up misleading the reader.
Much more could be said about Townley and the larger Condor connections to Italian fascism and figures connected with the Years of Lead and the P2 and Vatican Bank Scandals. Once again such investigations start to unravel a larger ball of yarn and all but demand new questions and new investigations which ultimately will become rather menacing to those who sit atop the system.
And why is it that Dinges won't pursue these questions or even raise them? Once again I cannot answer for someone else but given his credentials and standing I don't think it's too hard to guess why. Think about losing your pension, being stripped of awards and Ivy League accolades, not only losing access to sources but becoming a pariah in the community? Not many are going to entertain venturing down such a path.

Continue reading part 2