The Dalai Lama and Mongolian Intrigues

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5y772jlpgzo

In early July 2025, the Dalai Lama finally announced that he would have a successor, that there would be a reincarnation and a continuation of the office, which in Tibetan Buddhism is a manifestation (or emanation) of the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara. The Bodhisattvas are beings in the Mahayana tradition that have delayed their entrance to the state of Nirvana in order to help mankind. They are functionally a type of divine entity that some would compare to angels or gods, but such terms and concepts don't exactly fit. Nevertheless they are venerated and appealed to - and so from a Christian standpoint they are akin to gods are at least demi-gods.

Tibetan Buddhism in particular has focused on the concept of tulku - a reincarnated lama connected to these Bodhisattva figures. These appear in all the major schools of Tibetan Buddhism - the Dalai Lama is but one figure, representative of the Gelug sect - sometimes referred to as Yellow Hat.

Another less known figure is the Panchen Lama, another tulku-incarnation within the Gelug-Yellow Hat sect. Historically this figure has been something of a rival to the Dalai Lama, even while collaborating with him in other respects. The Panchen Lamas have played a different role in politics vis-a-vis both China and Mongolian Buddhism which is also connected to the Tibetan schools. The Panchen Lama has also traditionally played a role in the selection of the Dalai Lama and vice versa. Though not as well known in the West, he is and remains an important figure for both Tibet and the larger region.

The process of choosing a successor (usually a young boy) involves all manner of rituals, vision seeking, various tests regarding personal items connected to the previous incarnation, as well the imprimatur of other tulku personages.

After the 10th Panchen Lama died in 1989 (under somewhat suspicious circumstances), the present Dalai Lama (who has reigned since 1940) signified in 1995 that the six-year old boy Gedhun Choeki Nyima was the 11th incarnation of the Panchen Lama. Three days later he was taken by the Chinese authorities and has not been seen since. Six months later Beijing named Gyaltsen Norbu as the 11th Panchen Lama. And that's how things have stood for the past thirty years. To the Tibetan's loyal to the Dalai Lama, Beijing's Panchen Lama (Gyaltsen Norbu) is illegitimate and must be rejected.

The Dalai Lama has revealed that he has information that Gedhun is still alive but it's obvious Beijing will use its candidate to discredit any selection of a new Dalai Lama made in connection with the Dharamsala exile community in North India - home to the Tibetan ruler since his flight from Tibet in 1959.

It seems likely there will be rival Dalai Lamas and Beijing will use its candidate to sway and manipulate the situation in Tibet. At one point in time it sounded as if the present Dalai Lama was willing to end the cycle of incarnation - and the institution, if Beijing would agree to certain terms for Tibet. It's clear that as 2025, the Dalai Lama has given up any such hopes and refuses to simply allow Beijing an uncontested victory.

The best work I've encountered on this always fascinating but complicated topic is Isabel Hilton's 'The Search for the Panchen Lama' published in 1999 - just a few years after the boy's disappearance. The book provides the necessary context of Tibetan history and concepts in order to understand the present struggle. As helpful as it is, it has two major shortcomings.

First, it is dated and misses all the developments subsequent to the 1990's and the events connected to Beijing's rise to near super-power status - including its increased suppression of Tibetan identity, as well as it colonization of the plateau. Further, it was written before the Tibetan Uprising of 2008, and the mass protests and immolations that began to take place in the late 2000's and 2010's. So in some respects the book is dated but still of great value.

Readers would do well to understand that historical Tibet is bigger than the region on modern maps as the Tibetan communities also inhabit Qinghai, as well as portions of Gansu and Sichuan. These uprisings in the 2000's, combined with Uighur-Salafist terrorism in Xinjiang, and nationwide labour-related protests led Beijing to empower Xi Jinping in 2012, which in turn led to his clampdown and the consolidation of power - as well as a shift in China's foreign policy with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The fact that the 2008 uprising broke out just months before the Beijing Summer Games was particularly insulting to China and fostered suspicion of an international attempt at subterfuge - including accusations of CIA and NED instigation.

Second, Hilton's work completely ignores the role played by the United States during the 1950's and 1960's - in helping the Dalai Lama's 1959 escape, facilitating his Indian refuge, sponsoring a Tibetan resistance, and training guerillas in the United States, as well as flying insertion and support missions over the Himalayas from bases in India. These guerillas waged a campaign of strike and sabotage for many years - but were ultimately abandoned by the United States, especially as Kissinger and Nixon sought to exploit the Sino-Soviet split and to seek China's aid in winding down the Vietnam War. As a consequence both the Tibetans and Taiwanese would be abandoned to some extent by Washington.

The fact that Hilton chose to ignore this history represents a major defect in what is otherwise a supremely helpful account of Tibetan history up to the end of the 20th century.

It's also worth noting that while the Dalai Lama gets most of the attention, there are other tulku-lamas in exile - and they have their disputes with Beijing as well. Sikkim hosts the Karmapa Black Hat sect from Tibet - a lineage that is now also split between two claimants. One is backed by Karmapa exile community, while the other was acknowledged by the Dalai Lama and (odd as it may seem) by Beijing.

As Hilton points out, while the Dalai Lamas had become very powerful around the time of the Western Renaissance, they were never really viewed as the exclusive leaders of Tibet. However, the shattering of Tibet by the PRC in the 1950's has afforded the Dalai Lama in exile to consolidate power and he has effectively become the unitary voice of the Tibetan people.

When this Dalai Lama dies, there will an explosion of controversy surrounding his successor, the Panchen Lama, and perhaps some of the other Tibetan sects. You can be sure Beijing will be trying to play them off against one another. But there's another angle to consider - far to the north in Mongolia.

Mongolian Buddhism has long been connected to Tibet and in particular to the Dalai and Panchen Lamas. However, they too have a Gelug (or Yellow Hat) tulku-reincarnate lama - the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu. And his role became particularly important just over one-hundred years ago. But to explain it and how it's pertinent today, we need to briefly revisit the scene.

After the Qing Empire was overthrown and the Chinese Republic was established in 1911, all attempts at uniting the country failed, and within a few years the country fragmented into warlord-led fiefdoms. China would remain in a state of civil conflict until 1928 when the Kuomintang (led by Chiang Kai-shek) was able to consolidate power over most of the country. The 1930's would see this broken by communist insurrection and Japanese invasions - which dovetailed into the larger conflict of World War II. After 1945, the civil war was reinstigated with the communists (led by Mao Zedong) attaining victory on the mainland in 1949.

But in the 1920's, all of Asia was astir. The Russian Civil War coincided with the aforementioned Warlord Period in China and by 1920 all of the Russian Far East, Central Asia, Mongolia, and Manchuria was in turmoil. With China fragmented, the Japanese had their eye on Manchuria and what remained of the Russian Empire was involved in a multi-front civil war between Red Bolshevik and Anti-Revolutionary White forces - who were only united by their hatred of communism.

Siberia was also affected, and during this episode the strange figure of Baron Roman von Ungern-Sternberg emerges. Born in Austria of Baltic German heritage, his family (seated in Estonia) had historic ties to the Russian Empire, and the Bloody Baron (as he would be known) became a fanatic for the Russian monarchy and other rather esoteric ideas. Under the command of Japanese-backed White Russian leader and Cossack commander Grigory Semyonov, Ungern-Sternberg was active in the Baikal region and in Mongolia. He rose rapidly in the ranks and formed an Asiatic Brigade which included Tatars, Mongols, Tibetans, and others. Known for his severity, propensity to torture, and extreme violence, he butchered every Bolshevik he could get his hands on. Unlike some of the others in the White movement he was not committed to a restoration of the republic established by the February Revolution. He wanted a full restoration of the Tsar and the Russian imperium.

In the meantime some of the warlords in Northern China decided to re-capture Mongolia and invaded in 1919. The nation had been under Chinese rule since the 1600's but with the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu (the tulku-lama of Mongolia) declared independence and ruled as the Bogd Khan. And yet just eight years later the nation was occupied once again by the Chinese and the warlords of the fragmented empire turned republic.

Ungern-Sternberg had embraced numerous esoteric ideas and had cobbled together a rather unique religion combining elements of both Russian Nationalism (which includes Orthodoxy) and Buddhism. As the Russian Civil War turned against the Whites in 1920, the Japanese decided to take a less aggressive tact with regard to expansion into Mongolia - choosing instead to consolidate Manchurian rule in the puppet state of Manchukuo a decade later, Ungern-Sternberg seized the moment and struck. He wanted to liberate Mongolia from the Chinese Warlords and establish an Eastern Empire for the Tsar - he did not know that Grand Duke Michael (the presumed but uncrowned successor to Nicholas II after his abdication) had been murdered by the Bolsheviks at Perm in June of 1918. The attempt to create a new Eastern Russian Empire also found some support among the Buddhists of Mongolia as there had been legends of a 'Northern Emperor' who would liberate them. The Tsar (though dead) fit the bill as one who would liberate them from the Chinese, defeat the Bolsheviks, and unite the region's peoples in a kind of imperial-ecumenical polity.

Ungern-Sternberg's initial attempts to capture Urga (Ulaanbaatar) failed in the fall of 1920 and he was forced to retreat. He found supporters among the Mongolians including the Bogd Khan and finally succeeded in taking Urga in early 1921 - re-establishing the Bogd Khanate, even while massacring Chinese, Mongolian resistors, and Jews, which he associated with Bolshevism. Ungern-Sternberg and the Bogd Khan established an unofficial joint rule and made plans to consolidate power.

Alarmed by these developments, the Soviets re-tasked troops from both the Western fronts of the Civil War and their nominally autonomous Far Eastern Republic. They invaded in the spring of 1921 and captured Urga in July and promptly installed a Mongolian Communist (MPP) regime. In response, Ungern-Sternberg invaded Transbaikal or more specifically Russian Buryatia (home to a Mongol population) - dreaming of a campaign leading to Moscow itself. His forces were driven into a retreat and Ungern-Sternberg wanted to lead them to Tibet, but his troops mutinied and he was captured in August and executed in September 1921.

The Bogd Khan was able to retain his title until his death in 1924, but his power was broken as Mongolia was firmly in the hands of the Moscow-sponsored MPP. For the Chinese this was a great loss - they had been driven out by Ungern-Sternberg's Pan-Asiatic White forces who in turn were defeated by Russian-backed Mongol Communists. The region remained caught in the cauldron of East Asian geopolitics as the Chinese were unhappy with this arrangement and the Japanese were also exerting their interests. This would intensify in the 1930's with the full Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchurian in 1931 followed in subsequent by various battles and skirmishes taking place between the Soviets and Japanese which are usually viewed by historians as some of the earliest battles of World War II's Asian Theatre.

The Chinese were unable to re-assert their historic claims to Mongolia and by 1937 they faced a brutal (and this time large-scale) Japanese invasion. China under the Kuomintang was unable to restore any territory in 1945. When Chiang Kai-shek opposed the Soviet annexation of the Mongol region today known as Tuva in 1945, Stalin responded by continuing to occupy Manchuria until 1946 - and helped establish Mao's authority in the region, which proved critical to his victory in the final chapters of the Chinese Civil War. It was during this same campaign in August 1945, that the Soviets occupied the northern section of Korea. This August campaign would set the stage for not just the revived Chinese Civil War but the division of Korea - which would explode into conflict by 1950.

With Mao's 1949 victory in the civil war, the issue of Chinese claims on Mongolia became effectively moot as the USSR, Mongolia, and China were all supposedly part of the same allied communist bloc.

But it wasn't that simple. By the early 1960's the Sino-Soviet Split emerged and Mongolia was again caught in the middle - choosing to ally with Moscow. By the late 1960's the PRC and the USSR were almost in a state of war and the Soviets stationed considerable forces along the borders with Xinjiang and on the Mongol-Chinese border. By the summer of 1969, there was talk of nuclear war between the two nations - such a conflict would have engulfed Mongolia.

The US intervened and threatened the USSR, and within a couple of years Washington managed to flip China - shattering the Asiatic Red Bloc. Mao would die in 1976 and by the 1980's China had embraced capitalism.

China retains its capitalist economic model and thus cannot be called communist in any meaningful sense - though it is by no means a Liberal state either. It retains the communist nomenclature as the post-Mao government has no real claim of authority otherwise. This was further solidified by the Tianamen uprising in 1989. As China entered the 21st century, the great social upheavals brought on by the capitalist shift led the CCP to turn to the authoritarian leadership of Xi Jinping - easily the most powerful leader since Mao.

Beijing remains fearful of problems emerging within its frontiers and on its borders. The Tibet situation is fairly well known having received a great deal of media attention and it has been the subject of Hollywood movies.

However, Mongolia is still part of the equation. Russian troops withdrew in 1989 and with the end of the Cold War, Mongolia has sought to establish strong ties with both Moscow and Beijing - though China has established a much stronger economic relationship.

The US has courted Mongolia as well. Bush visited in 2005, and Biden as vice-president in 2011. Trade with the landlocked country is limited but the US would love to establish strategic and military ties with Mongolia - something both Beijing and Moscow do not want to see.

And so at this point we must return to the question of the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, the Gelug lama of Mongolia.

After the death of Bogd Khan in 1924, there was something of an interlude. In 1936, Jampal Namdol Chökyi Gyaltsen (a Tibetan) was recognized by Lhasa as the 9th Jebtsundamba Khutughtu, the reincarnation of the Bogd Khan. But this was kept secret and Jampal Namdol remained in Tibet - and went to India with the Dalai Lama in 1959. He was not revealed to the world until 1990, with the end of the Cold War and the Mongol Revolution of 1990 which established multi-party rule. His identity had been kept hidden for over fifty years. He remained in India until 2011 when he finally was installed in Mongolia, where he was to die a year later.

In 2016, to the chagrin of Beijing, the Dalai Lama visited Mongolia and announced the next reincarnation of the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu had been born - but his identity also remained secret. In 2023, the Dalai Lama announced the arrival of the Jebtsundamba in Dharamsala, India where he is to receive instruction in the faith. Beijing responded by punishing Mongolia, imposing tariffs and fees, border closings, and a collapse of loan negotiations. One article also suggests Beijing has provided financial backing to the Shugden - a Tibetan sect opposed to the Dalai Lama. Before the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950, the Dalai Lama's had placed restrictions on this sect, with the current Dalai Lama condemning it once again in the 1970's.

The Dalai Lama angered Beijing by recognition of a new Jebtsundamba, but to make it worse he's an American citizen, born in Washington DC - where his Mongolia-born parents are still based. And it's very likely he will play a role in ratifying the new Dalai Lama when the time comes. This new American-born Jebtsundamba Khutughtu is considered the reincarnation of the Bogd Khan and while the story of Mongolian intrigue and the attempt to establish a Buddhist Khanate a century ago is unknown in the West, you can be sure the story is well known in Beijing - where memories are long.

As Hilton points out in her work, it's bizarre that an ostensibly atheist regime would be caught up in a question of reincarnate lamas, oracles, and sacred objects. Further the whole Bogd Khan-Ungern Sternberg episode was fraught with mythology and mysticism. The Bloody Baron viewed himself as a Mongolian war god, perhaps even as a reincarnation of Genghis Khan himself.

Ferdinand Ossendowski (1876-1945) was an anti-Bolshevist who escaped their nets in Siberia and found himself caught up in the events involving the Bogd Khan and Ungern Sternberg. He wrote of this in Beasts, Men, and Gods published in 1922, just a year after the events in question and Ungern Sternberg's execution. Ossendowski provides a helpful and accurate account of the warfare on the Mongol-Transbaikal front as well as the attempt to punch south toward Tibet. At one point there was an attempt to reach the Japanese who backed some of the White forces in Siberia - and Ossendowski was the envoy. This mission allowed him to escape the collapse of Ungern Sternberg's Asiatic Brigade. He would then make his way to the United States and eventually back to Poland.

Ossendowski also writes of strange prophecies and miracles and Agharta - the mystical underground kingdom of great power. These stories also fueled Mongolian hopes of resisting both the Chinese and Soviets. In other words its all tied in with a kind of mystic Buddhist-inspired nationalism - the kind of thing Beijing fears and would not want to see rekindled in either Mongolia or Tibet. The new reincarnation of the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu (and Bogd Khan) is certain to stoke those fears and rekindle some of these memories. The American connection doesn't help.

The larger story and contextualisation of this mysticism is chronicled in works such as Andrei Znamenski's Red Shambhala (2011) - a helpful if flawed and rather biased work, and James Palmer's The Bloody White Baron (2011).

The energy that encompasses the period is certain to generate concern - especially the prospect that strategies might be resurrected and events might be repeated. The US is openly planning for war with China and part of this larger strategy includes (at least in some American quarters) the take-down of Russia. A successful sequel to the events of the early 1920's in the greater Mongol theatre would help US efforts and potentially stir up a hornet's nest for Beijing. Combine this with US-sponsorship of Uighur guerillas and China could face a real struggle - all the more in the context of a larger war. One need not support Xi's restrictive measures to nevertheless understand them and what motivates such moves being taken.

In 1950, Kuomintang troops were positioned in Burma and there was serious discussion of having them invade China from the south during the context of the Korean War. Such a move might have made Mao less enthusiastic to cross the Yalu into North Korea in order to engage MacArthur. No one knows for sure but I wonder how many military strategists and historians have revisited that decision not to invade with regret. And how many are thinking once again of a multi-front and multi-pronged strategy? Burma is also once again in the news and the subject of a proxy war.

The US has attempted to foster close military ties with India in order to counter China. This relationship has had its ups and downs. With Trump it has taken something of a nosedive. The US has sponsored Uighur separatists and al Qaeda affiliates. Washington continues to back the Dalai Lama - even if the Tibetan leader has not always been overly thrilled with America's self-interested policies. It's only natural the US would want to support the Tibetan-affiliated Buddhist community in Mongolia.
The next event of significance will most likely be the death of the present Dalai Lama (b.1935). That event will trigger a series of actions from multiple fronts and there are too many possibilities to count. But in just the past few years the situation has grown even more complicated. In addition to the tensions over the South China Sea, Taiwan, and Tibet, there is now a growing Mongolian angle.