https://theopolisinstitute.com/leithart_post/epistemological-dualism/
Right from the onset I disagree with Meek's airtight definitions and the way she wishes to imply how such epistemological dualism operates. I further disagree with Leithart's insinuation that this leads to the elimination of knowledge. It's a slippery slope argument that is misleading at best.
Epistemological dualism does not eliminate knowledge at all - but it limits it and thus limits man's ability to predicate, to form comprehensive theories and systems, and thus also eliminates common arguments along the lines of causality and teleology. It is therefore not conducive to the kind of unified theory/worldview-ism espoused by Leithart.
For Christians, the solution to this dilemma is found in revelation and yet this only provides limited, specific, and analogical knowledge - once again, far short of the kind of worldviewism so championed today.
Meek is simply mistaken. We don't cut off knowledge from 'us'. Rather we understand that all knowledge is affected and shaped by our skewed perceptions. As Christians we know that we are fallen and have a proclivity toward sin, idolatry, and self-deception. One wonders here if Leithart is embracing the kind of thinking seen in Thomism and its practical rejection of the noetic effects of the fall.
Leithart seems to revel in Meek's flawed notion of the integrated person that tends toward the monistic models so often championed by Dominionism.
In reality, the kind of integrated epistemological model advocated by both Meek and Leithart is best described as a sure formula for self deception - a tendency and danger toward question begging.
Epistemological monism or more specifically in this case, Direct Realism was the guiding thought within Scottish Common Sense Realism - a school that opposed not only Hume, but the epistemological dualism (or indirect realism) of both Locke and Descartes (both the Empiricist and Rationalist schools). Despite its errors (or perhaps because of them) it remained exceedingly popular in the American context throughout the colonial period and the 19th century.
Not long after this aberrant epistemology re-appeared in the thought of the Logical Positivists - their materialism being the real (and perhaps inevitable or consistent) harvest of this kind of thinking. Obviously I realize that both Meek and Leithart would reject the Logical Positivist programme and the assertions of that school and yet this tendency re-appears over and over again in the Anglo-American Analytic tradition. The Continental tradition has its own issues with rationalism, subjectivity, and idealism. Both traditions are ultimately in error and yet both have their shining moments and are able to offer some (if limited) insight.
Bertrand Russell at one time advocated the Direct Realism espoused by Meek and Leithart but abandoned it - by some accounts due to the withering critique offered by AO Lovejoy in his still pertinent work from 1930 - The Revolt Against Dualism, a book I have often referenced and recommended. Lovejoy was not a Christian and I hardly wish to endorse his views but rather employ his comprehensive critique of monistic epistemologies - whether Idealist, Pragmatist, Logical Positivist - or its antecedents in the thought of figures like AN Whitehead, and Bertrand Russell.
Both Meek and Leithart would do well to read it and to additionally review Paul's arguments in the opening chapters of 1 Corinthians - a devastating critique of both humanistic epistemology and philosophy as a whole.
Knowledge requires an understanding of purpose and context and this eludes us and in fact the transcendent, eternal, and eschatological nature of reality is unattainable to us - especially after the fall. Critical aspects of these things are revealed, and yet as mysteries (as per the apostle) they are not the basis for further predication but rather humility. At best we can hope for a kind informed ignorance as Nicholas of Cusa argued six centuries ago - a type of knowledge that allows us to live in this present evil age, but a long way from the kind of system-building seen in philosophers and would-be Dominionist theologians. The epistemological programme offered by both Meek and Leithart lead to not only self-deception in the realm of philosophy, but a prolegomenal error that will also play out in theological construction and ethics.
It can also be argued that Direct Realism has played a role in forming (in some Christian quarters) a kind of epistemological monism that flirts with pantheism. This author would be among those who argue this tendency is present in Dominionism and in the kind of sacralized thought exhibited by Leithart, Doug Wilson, and others associated with both the Rushdoonyite and Kuyperian traditions.