19 August 2020

Trump +1307: Middle Eastern Geopolitics, Switching Alliances and American Absenteeism (I)


It is really in the realm of foreign policy that Trump has upset the American Establishment in the strongest of terms – and I'm not referring to the failed Russiagate scandal. As a vehicle to remove him from office that plot failed but in the meantime his presidency has marked some other significant changes and in some settings and theatres his haphazard pursuit of policy has resulted in change – largely in terms of instability and a serious decline in American influence and standing.


In the Middle East, his embrace of the bin Salman-instigated Saudi shake-up and the semi-abandonment of the Syrian War (after the final but somewhat inconclusive defeat of ISIS) has upset many. Additionally, Trump pulled out of the Iranian nuclear deal which has created dilemmas for nations in not only in the Middle East but in Europe. Trump continues to vacillate with regard to Afghanistan but he's not alone in this. Other sectors in the US Establishment have also changed course over the years when it comes to the fight with the various permutations of the Taliban. But right now even as Trump is trying to get out, there are powerful sectors within the US that want American troops to stay.
He has proven schizophrenic toward Libya and has failed to understand how critical the nation has become to the stability of not only North Africa but the Mediterranean – and then of course there's the question of who gets to control its oil. And if that wasn't enough, there's serious trouble brewing in Lebanon.
Overall his administration has been characterised as one of weakness and withdrawal and as a consequence he has opened the door for other nations to step in and within just a few short years the character of the region's geopolitics is changing. The ending of the Iranian nuclear deal amplified the regional cold war and thus we could say that not only have the players changed, he has contributed to a changing of the board.
Some rather stunning rumours are being floated that Washington is in talks with the PKK – the Kurdistan Worker's Party. For over twenty years Washington backed the Turkish state in its war against the Kurds and specifically the PKK, mostly located in the southeast of Turkey. Kemalism, the secularist Turkish nationalism that defined modern Turkey waged war against subcultures within its borders and the Kurds, an Iranian-related group with a very different culture were non-conformists and thus enemies of the state.
Turkey pursued a relentless war against the Kurds, seeking to destroy their very culture – in international terms their campaign was a war crime but the US helped provide the cover Ankara needed. In the 1980's the countryside was emptied as Kurds fled to urban centres – the rural areas and wilds becoming a setting for guerilla warfare. Tens of thousands were killed. The Kurds turned to terrorist tactics while the Turkish state was brutal in its treatment of the Kurds and certainly guilty of ethnic cleansing.
Washington supported Ankara and the PKK has long been reckoned a terrorist organisation. But the relationship turned schizophrenic after the Gulf War in 1991. The PKK also operated out of Northern Iraq but in that context, they were allies in the fight against Saddam Hussein.
When Erdogan came to power in 2003, he began to steer Turkey away from its subjugated position within the NATO system. He also wanted to move Turkey away from its Kemalism and sought to re-introduce a fairly mild form of Islamic identity. Others had attempted this before but the Turkish military (in conjunction with Washington) would step in and overthrow them. They (the Turkish Deep State) were also plotting to take out Erdogan but failed as he was able to break up the plot. He had utterly stunned Washington in refusing to allow the Americans to use his territory as a Northern base for the invasion of Iraq. The existing bases would provide logistical support but Erdogan didn't want the war being fought from his borders. Washington viewed this as a betrayal but Erdogan outmaneuvered their attempts at removing him.
In the meantime his outreach to the Kurds – who could be accepted as fellow Muslims and not simply viewed as non-Turks (Mountain Turks that had forgotten their identity) surprised the world and it looked like peace was at hand. Kemalism's 'Happy is he who is called a Turk' was being slowly replaced by a broad Islamist ideology – but one still quite hostile to Salafist militarism. In some respects it is similar to what one finds in some of the Central Asian republics – a kind of deliberate and enshrined cultural Islam which is way too conservative for secularists and liberals but far too liberal for the ultra-conservatives.
Under Erdogan's re-casting of Kemalism, the vicious war in the Southeast could finally come to an end. But as Erdogan realised the West was angling against him and seeking to destroy him economically and politically, and that the Western-backed Syria War might lead to an independent Kurdish state on his southern border, he switched gears and turned against the Kurds once more in 2015.
This animosity between Erdogan and his enemies has grown and it culminated in the 2016 attempted coup by the military in which Erdogan was only minutes away from being assassinated. Evidence suggests strong US connections to this attempted overthrow of his government.
Western media focuses on his clampdowns, his suppression of journalists, his arrest of missionaries, his persecution of the Kurds, his rapprochement with regard to Russia and his role in the Syrian War. But from Erdogan's perspective both he and his nation have been repeatedly betrayed and subjugated by the Western powers. They manipulate his politics, threaten his economy, harbour his enemies and plot against him.
But if things were already tense, now they're really heating up. As the Syrian War ends, the focus is now once more on Libya and issues of energy and shipping in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has abandoned its hopes of joining the EU and has instead turned once more to Neo-Ottomanism in which they hope to use their geography and unique Eurasian positioning as an advantage. Turkey touches on Europe, the Black Sea region (which includes both the Slavic worlds and the Caucasus), the Mediterranean and of course the Middle East. There are also cultural connections to the Turkic nations of Central Asia and the various Turkic communities throughout the Middle East. It is uniquely positioned which is also why the Bosphorus and Asia Minor have been the battleground of nations and civilisations since antiquity. The Turks have been there a thousand years but they're the latecomers.
The situation within Libya and the tensions with Greece (and now France) are intensifying. Egypt is also part of this informal anti-Turkish alliance as the nation has an interest both in neighbouring Libya and the Mediterranean. The instability in Lebanon (exacerbated by the 4 August Beirut explosions) has created a vacuum that Neo-colonial powers like the French are quick to capitalise on. From their vantage point, a failure to do so will leave the door open for nations like Turkey, Iran and even Russia. That's why Macron was in Lebanon almost immediately after the massive explosion that took place in the city centre.
It is in this context that Washington is apparently willing to bury the hatchet and make peace with the PKK. The peace has already been functional within Iraq and it became fairly open within the context of Northern Syria as the SDF and YPG forces were basically dominated by the Syrian branch of the PKK. But in Turkey, Washington couldn't support them. Turkey is a NATO ally. And yet while Turkey hasn't yet left NATO, Washington is effectively conspiring with paramilitaries fighting against a NATO ally. This is but another indication of NATO's collapse and a sign of Washington's utter exasperation with Erdogan. They want him removed but can't seem to shake him loose.
The relationship between Israel and the Kurds has also been complicated. In the context of Iraq and Iran, the Kurds are allies – non-Arabs who are resisting the Arab Sunni regime in Baghdad – or at least that was the case for many decades. While Iran is a natural ally for Israel and was so under the Shah, the regime of the ayatollahs is an avowed enemy and threat to Israel, and in that context the Kurds have provided a base for Israeli intelligence operations directed against Iran. While the Kurdish movement for independence has not been as vigorous in Iran, it still exists and Tehran fears it. The nationalist Kurds of Northern Iraq and Southeastern Turkey had no love for Islamic Republic of Iran or its culture.
Turkey, another non-Arab nation on Israel's periphery and a member of NATO was long an ally of Tel Aviv but under Erdogan this has completely broken down and now both Israel and its 'ally' Egypt (under Western backed dictator al-Sisi) stand against Turkish interests in the region and in the Eastern Mediterranean. It follows that Israel is also likely to provide aid to the Turkish PKK – especially if Washington is doing the same.
Of course one wonders if Washington will stab the Kurds in the back once more – as they've done on multiple occasions since the 1970's. For the Kurds, the dream of Kurdistan lives on, but were the situation to change in Turkey, they may find the US will quickly turn against them once more. It is to be expected that they will be suspicious of Washington as there is a great deal of baggage – the US aided Turkey both logistically, militarily and diplomatically in their war against the Kurds and the PKK and the US intelligence also helped in the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in Nairobi in 1999. He remains imprisoned on an island in the Sea of Marmara.
As mentioned the PKK is a designated terrorist organisation and so unless the US Congress reverses that status – which right now is unlikely – the US relationship with the PKK will remain unofficial and 'secret', though everyone will know about it. From the PKK's perspective such an arrangement is probably for the best.
Likewise the Israelis have continued their shift away from their traditional Arab-periphery strategy. The Arabs are our enemies therefore we form alliances with states just beyond the Arab periphery – the Kurds, Iranians, Turks, and (since Pakistan has closely allied with Arab forces) – India.
But the relationship with Iran broke in 1979. Since Erdogan is entrenched, the relationship with Turkey has crumbled. And so in light of the instability in neighbouring Lebanon and Syria and the fact that these nations are strongly influenced by an ever-hostile Iran – Israel has been forced to re-cast its strategy and find friends among the Arabs that hate both Turkey and Iran. It was unthinkable for many decades as there was the persistent Palestinian problem. They were fellow Arabs and Muslims who had been expelled and additionally since the 1967 Six Day War, Al-Quds (or Jerusalem) was in the hands of the Zionist infidels. It was intolerable. The American-backed Israelis never gave up but apparently a good number of the Arab states have out of pragmatism given up the Palestinian cause.
This coupled with the fact that the Saudis and Iranians are in a regional Cold War and that the Saudis and Emiratis are moving ever closer to Washington – both the Gulf Arabs and Israelis have become functional allies, in an alliance that is starting to become more open and overt. The Israeli-UAE deal that just broke in August 2020 signals this and it is in this capacity that Trump and his Israeli/Likud-connected son-in-law Kushner are playing a role.
In some respects it's stunning that this kind of rapprochement and detente would take place under Likud leadership in Israel but it's a case of only Nixon can go to China. The hard nationalists are the ones who can afford to compromise – and for Israel, to cut deals with the Gulf Arabs is something that a previous generation could not have imagined.
But again this is rather shocking in light of the Palestinian dilemma. It would seem that some seventy years after the Nakba of 1948, the Arabs are at last giving up and accepting Israeli legitimacy. This is of course viewed as a massive betrayal on the part of the Palestinians and will certainly fuel a new chapter of radicalism. The official pan-Arab struggle is (it would seem) coming to an end. The Two-State solution is effectively dead in light of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The Palestinians are divided and seemingly irreconcilable. The Palestinian Authority in the West Bank is impotent and corrupt and the Hamas faction in Gaza will not work with them nor make peace with the Israelis. For their part the Gulf States are looking for allies against Iran and don't think for a moment that oil isn't playing a part in all of this.*  
This turn on the part of the Gulf States has the potential to re-kindle Salafi attempts to overthrow their monarchies – one of the original points of contention made by al Qaeda back in the 1990's, and in some respects their Western-Zionist compromise echoes the grievances made by the militants who seized the Grand Mosque in 1979.
Additionally, it allows Iran to seize the initiative as the 'faithful' leader of the Islamic world. The monarchies are compromised, sold out to the West and Iran is still fighting the good fight as it were – supporting Hezbollah, Hamas and others that resist the Israeli occupation. Iran may be a Persian Shiite entity but it's first and foremost an 'Islamic' republic.
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*Petroleum isn't just a resource it's also a political tool as exemplified by the recent episode of high seas piracy – the United States stole 1.1 million barrels of gasoline from Iranian tankers bound for Venezuela – a nation that no longer has the capacity to refine its own oil. The Venezuelan debacle and the US crimes related to that country are beyond the scope of this essay but it demonstrates a manner in which these questions are often interrelated.